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Law in the Flesh: Tracing Legitimation’s Origin 
to The Act of Killing?
Richard K. Sherwin*
For in the exercise of violence over life and death more than in any other legal act,
law reaffirms itself. But in this very violence something rotten in law is revealed…
Walter Benjamin
What is at issue here is […] not simply the question of the sources of legitimate
political rule but, more profoundly, our capacity to feel represented in the social field,
to experience those representations as viable facilitations of our vitality.
Eric Santner
The undying spirit of [Natural] Law can never be extinguished.
If it is denied entry into the body of positive law, it flutters about the room like a ghost,
and threatens to turn into a vampire which sucks the blood from the body of Law.
Otto Gierke
A proper respect for civil order does not mandate the elision of political violence. To 
the contrary, civility requires that we explore the exercise of violence at the beginning 
of state sovereignty. To forget, or repress, originary violence invites its return. That 
is why, with its insistence upon rational calculation and the neutralization of desire, 
the vast cleanup operation of liberal theory is bound to fail.
The exception proves the rule, and the state of exception, upon which the 
one who is sovereign decides (Schmitt 2005, 5), proves the rule of law. The state of 
exception is the moment that reveals the true source of state power, the ultimate 
source of law. As Schmitt writes: ‘The exception, which is not codified in the existing 
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2legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the 
existence of the state’ (Ibid., 6). By declaring a state of emergency, or by creating one, 
the sovereign makes clear where unbound power lies. We cannot but confront this 
distasteful insight: confront it, explore it, and judge it—particularly with regard to 
the expressive commitment to foundational narratives and symbolic representations 
that precedes, and that may or may not emerge from the state of exception. Fidelity 
to law, a key component of law’s legitimation (see Hart 96), originates in, and is 
constituted by, such a commitment. It signifies investiture: authorizing state violence 
through the convergence of power and meaning, a normative synthesis that aims to 
render law’s authority worthy of acceptance. 
In the state of exception foundational political meanings often fragment and 
grow incoherent. When power and meaning are sundered the ship of state loses 
both anchor and compass. Out of the crisis of belief that ensues we encounter an 
inexpressible excess, the inchoate source of the state’s political vitality, what Schmitt 
calls ‘the power of real life’ (Schmitt 2005, 5), the body politic’s libidinal flame. 
Eros is the name we give to the creative force out of which political worlds are 
made, out of the political unconscious known as the flesh of the law. Here we find 
the originating impulse that is needed to invest in a world of meaning. That force 
surges forth in a liminal state, betwixt and between terror and enchantment. It is 
then that we ask, what symbolic social bond will be endorsed? What nomos will we 
inhabit? What links my body to another: what shared narrative of origin, or what 
collective terror?
With the general acceptance of state power as legal authority, based on 
uncoerced commitment to binding core values, the specter of violence recedes. The 
foundational story of the state takes over. Enchantment ensues. The liminal creature, 
in the bare flesh of his or her own being, decides to commit to a world of political 
and legal significance. 
To invest in a proffered meaning, or not, to decide and to act, or not, culminates 
in the challenge of bare life at its most elemental: to be or not? And if it is to be, 
how does one acclaim a world of meaning? What does it demand? These questions 
coincide with the origin of politics (as the possibility of deciding on the reality of 
shared public life) and of sovereignty (as the moment of collective investiture): will 
we, and if so, how will we invest the world with meaning? How do we make politics 
happen? We witness this political drama in great literature, in the words and actions 
of characters like Hamlet and Caliban, and, in a more recent, but eerily similar 
vintage, in the words and actions of real world characters, like Anwar Congo, who 
appears in Joshua Oppenheimer’s highly unsettling film, The Act of Killing (202). 
These works invite reflection and judgment: What does the inward state of 
lived meaning or, if meaning fails, of terror and paralysis, tell us about the outer 
state, politics writ large? There is no getting away from this vital link, the capacity 
to register the pulsations of law in the flesh both collectively (in the public rite of 
investiture) and singly (in the solitary experience of fidelity to what law demands). 
Here we discover the vicissitudes of bio-politics.
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In the foundational moment that is the state of exception, creature and 
sovereign remain undifferentiated: the reality of the one still depends upon the 
reality of the other. The fabric of being has yet to be woven. When that signification 
coheres the metaphysics of its world may be known (Schmitt 2005, 46). Metaphysics, 
understood here as the shared understanding of a newly emergent reality, is the 
offshoot of collective libidinal investment. We find the hidden poetic structure of the 
symbolic world in which we live by following the paths love travels. 
Withdrawal of love from the world, the de-cathexis of libido that cast Freud’s 
famous patient, Daniel Paul Schreber, the Saxon jurist, into a state of wild psychosis, 
is a form of destruction (of self and external reality). Writing about his descent into 
psychosis, Schreber described how he felt his body as rotting flesh. It is a story of 
unbearable excess—the mute trauma of the body in pain, a state in which one may 
be certain, but only of suffering. As Freud said of Schreber: ‘The end of the world is 
the projection of [Schreber’s] internal catastrophe. His subjective world has come to 
an end since his withdrawal of love from it’ (Santner 20, 22). This withdrawal of 
love, the process of retracting libido from the world, de-animates reality, emptying it 
of significance. In legal terms, we might call this ‘dis-investiture’. It is enacted in the 
political dramas of dethronement (as in the beheading of Charles I) and revolution.
Investment of love in the world, commitment to its gifts and demands in the 
overflow of excess desire, creates an erotic bond out of which political life begins. 
The social contract arises from, and is sealed by law in the flesh. ‘The sacral soma’, 
Eric Santner calls it (Ibid., xv). It is this ‘sublime substance’ that constitutes the King’s 
(second, or) transcendent body and, in the transition to modernity, from monarchy 
to popular sovereignty, it is this excess, this overflow of vitality, that the people inherit, 
and that sacralizes the people’s transcendent body. The political event out of which 
sovereignty and law first emerge coincides with the birth of wild meaning—from out 
of the state of exception, when all is in flux and the mind gapes in fear and wonder, 
when beings are named as if for the first time, as if language and being were one, as 
if words were the very voice of what is (see Merleau-Ponty 968, 55). That is when 
legal symbols and representations become real enough to live by, to bind the popular 
will, and warrant fidelity to law.
Legal theorists argue about fidelity to law. As the old positivist/natural law 
debate puts it: once you have a valid legal system does content matter? Must law be 
moral? (See Fuller 958). If law is law simply by fulfilling the criteria for validity, isn’t 
state power always already authorized by definition? But if that is so, if legitimacy 
 Julia Lupton’s description of the character Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest conveys the sense of ‘creature’ 
I wish to express here, namely: an abject, thing-like being, of passionate passivity, who is also ‘a remnant of 
the divine Logos in the process of still becoming’ (Lupton 2005, 6). The creature is both resentful (of an 
external subjugating power) and filled with wonder (gripped by a different source of power that he senses 
within himself as a dreamlike possibility) (Ibid., 7). This tension reflects the Benjaminian sense of the 
creaturely as a quintessential aspect of the baroque soul: at once ‘sullen angel’ and ‘pensive dog’ (Ibid. 6-4). 
In one sense, the creature is the sovereign’s creation; in another, it is the other way around. This restates the 
state of exception as a condition of the political event out of which new syntheses of power and meaning (new 
legal worlds) may emerge.
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4requires no more than validity, then legitimacy may come from the barrel of a gun, 
with the state acting as the gunman writ large. Requiring fidelity to law as a necessary 
element of legitimacy, beyond simply fulfilling the criteria for law’s validity as law, 
overcomes the moral dilemma posed by recognizing all valid law as legitimate—
even if it is based on terror or coercion. Requiring acceptance of law’s authority as a 
necessary component of legitimacy (see Hart 96), particularly popular acceptance 
(see Sherwin 986), raises the question: Does the rule of law warrant obedience? Is 
it right to obey? In this sense, investiture, the public ceremony of investing power 
with meaning, signals a collective acclamation (see Agamben 20): it is good and 
right to obey the sovereign.
But have you ever wondered what is it that makes a particular symbolic order 
(such as law) feel right? Have you wondered by what process a world of synthetic 
meaning acquires the characteristics of reality? (Santner 20, xvi). How is it that a 
second-order reality, the created worlds of ideas and principles, symbols and norms, 
becomes the home we live in, our invisible ‘second’ nature?
To understand, and, yes, ultimately to revitalize, the act of investiture, to re-
enact our investment in the founding political event, whose legacy we carry like a 
home on our backs, it is to the original scene of the political event—acclaiming the 
normalization of state violence (as ‘legitimate’)—that we must return, to explore, 
theorize, and judge. We do so as a prelude, most necessary, to taking responsibility 
for state power as legitimate authority, to re-acclaim our fidelity to law by way of the 
foundational, and subsequently ritualized, performance of investiture. 
We risk this return to the scene of political and legal origin, of law in the flesh, 
because theorizing without the flesh, absent the originary violence and creative 
excess of desire, falsifies political and legal reality. It is like dancing without a dancer, 
like imagining law without the humanities, like aspiring to become a machine.2 The 
political event cannot begin, or even appear to theory as such, without confronting 
the primal scene of political violence and unstable desire. It is the very scene from 
which enchantment arises—responding to the call of the world and others to invest 
Being in beings on the public stage of politics. Here is the original erotic bond, the 
covenant that constitutes our investment in, and commitment to, a world of shared 
meaning. 
Fleshless, neutered theory, including the liberal-democratic theory of popular 
sovereignty, cannot fully succeed because it cannot account for the way states begin 
and end in history (investiture and dis-investiture), nor can it account for the 
libidinal source (in whatever sublimated form it may take) that drives and sustains 
fidelity to law. When the power of acclamation, in the committed practice of fidelity 
to law, fades into the perfect administrative state (in which ‘things administer 
themselves’ (Schmitt 2004, 5)) re-acclamation beckons. Failing that, the lingering 
sense of something rotten at the heart of the state persists. This is the way to Beckett’s 
Endgame: in the kingdom of the undead, endless bare life in a perpetual state of 
2 As pop artist Andy Warhol succinctly put it: ‘Everybody should be a machine’ (Warhol 96, 6).
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5emergency. In short, political catastrophe.
Law on autopilot, like law as the sovereign’s naked command, reveals a condition 
Gersholm Scholem hauntingly described as validity without significance (Scholem 
992, 42). This is Kafka’s law: the functional mechanics of power without meaning 
or belief. In such systems, subjects are acted upon; they do not decide. They do not 
help to perform political or legal reality. Agency gives way to restless stasis. Restless 
stasis—Hamlet’s state, a condition of intense distraction perpetuating indecision 
and paralysis of action—not a bad image for the predominant mood of baroque 
culture, including the neo- (or digital) baroque culture in which we live now, a 
state of affairs in which representational forms proliferate wildly, online and in 
court. Rules, policies, principles, regulations abound, a profusion of legal forms and 
representations whose chief merit is that they maintain the status quo. It is enough, it 
would seem, simply to surf the surfaces of form on the surface of the media that host 
them. It passes the time4 while we run in place. What could fidelity to law possibly 
mean under such baroque conditions? That, in a nutshell, is the challenge we face.
Political urgency intensifies when the most significant decisions have to be 
made and dispositive actions immediately undertaken. Like when the legitimacy of 
the state falls under a cloud. It is precisely this crisis of legitimation that Hamlet faces 
when the ghost of the recently dead king, Hamlet’s father, appears to him, seeking 
rectification for regicide. The king’s brother, Claudius, has usurped the throne and 
defiled royal investiture by murdering the rightful king, the specter announces. The 
state has grown rotten with illegitimate rule. And so a state of emergency exists, 
beginning in Hamlet’s mind, then infecting the entire kingdom, once Hamlet is able 
to declare it, and take the required action, in blood. Which is to say, once Hamlet is 
able to find the resources to convert his state of restless stasis into violent political 
action.
It is then that the play becomes the thing—to make something happen, to shift 
 Both seventeenth century baroque and contemporary neo-baroque culture show signs of a state of emergency 
in the soul that reigns in parallel with the political state of emergency without. 
I have written elsewhere about the baroque condition as follows: 
Creation without grace assumed a ghostly appearance. As in a dream, discrete fragments piled 
up, concatenating on a landscape of ruin. And as yearning heightened, seeking escape from the 
corrupted state of worldly affairs, aesthetic forms proliferated. It was as if the desperate reaching out 
toward a distant heaven, as if to outrun an encroaching darkness, could only express itself in further 
decorative embellishments, like infinite folds within a compressed, but seemingly infinite, translunary 
space. In an effort to stave off the uncanny monstrousness of empty form, to tamp down the fear 
of Nothing, what Lyotard has aptly described as the fear of the non-occurrence of the event, the 
baroque imagination can only make more of the same, as if only this colossal profusion of expressive 
form could avert catastrophe. And so, like arabesques endlessly improvising their monadic design, 
baroque ornamentation proliferated. Dizzying, decentering, even nauseating in their spatial and visual 
onslaught. (Sherwin 20, 07.)
4 This neo-baroque effect is nicely captured in the empty profusion of hyper-brief film fragments that 
constitute Christian Marclay’s 24 hour long film work, The Clock. Go to: <https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Y8svkK7d7sY> (last visited 6 May 204). Ryan Trecartin’s pop video images attain a similarly neo-
baroque, albeit more circus-like effect. For a visual sample, go to: <http://vimeo.com/trecartin> (last visited 
6 May 204).
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6the mood from the subjunctive (anxious, thought-heavy dithering) to the imperative 
(Claudius must die!). That is the mood shift Hamlet must undergo. But to get there he 
first needs to experience what it is like for sovereign and creature to merge, to carry 
his country’s fate on his back (Shakespeare, Hamlet I.v.90) whilst being reduced 
to flesh (I.ii.29), set naked (IV.vii.44), in a ‘stale, unweeded garden’, (I.ii.)‘rank 
and gross in nature’ (I.ii.6), poised on the edge of the grave (V.i.72), peering in, 
to contemplate even the most noble conqueror in history (V.i.95) reduced to dust, 
which is to say, divested of sovereign power. Where is the King’s transcendent body 
now?5
In the end, nothing remains but the legitimating story: how Hamlet has set 
things right, in the violent counter-stroke of rectifying regicide, to be recounted in a 
story whose very telling restores the vital conditions of legitimacy, including fidelity to 
sovereign rule. The very telling, and retelling, of this foundational narrative performs 
investiture. It establishes and preserves legitimate authority by the signifying force of 
the great beginning-tale of stasis and action, born of bare life, suffused with suffering 
and death, containing (even as it performs) the wild meaning of law in the flesh:
Let this same be presently perform’d,
Even while men’s minds are wild; lest more mischance
On plots and errors, happen. (V.ii.77-79.)
No sooner has the elemental political event occurred than it is to be symbolically 
re-enacted. The play—this foundational story, originating out of the primal scene 
of political violence, illegitimate on the one hand, re-legitimating on the other, this 
account that we witness, being performed before us, together with the one nestled 
within it (to test the conscience of the illegitimate King), this story of revitalized 
investiture which Horatio announces in the end, incarnates a new beginning-tale. 
Its public re-telling is now Hamlet’s great legacy, and Horatio’s sole purpose in life: to 
explain the prince’s tragic death, how he set Denmark’s affairs aright. The play becomes 
the thing that compels judgment in a performance designed to catch the conscience 
of the public, perhaps to dispel political stasis writ large, sparking an effort to renew 
state legitimacy, while the public’s mind is wild—perhaps even stoking wildness in 
the retelling. Having thus brought its public closer to the state of emergency (within 
and without), the performative reality of law in the flesh may be grasped anew in its 
signifying glory. Grasped—which is to say, simultaneously understood and seized? 
As if the invitation to break with political stasis might purge the state of illegitimate 
violence even if by means of counter-violence?6 How subversive to perform Hamlet 
5 See Hamlet V.i.99-202:
Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to clay,
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away:
O, that that earth, which kept the world in awe,
Should patch a wall to expel the winter flaw!
6 As suggestive of the force cultural productions, such as plays and popular films, may have on the political 
stage, we may recall the many Occupy Wall Street protesters who wore ‘V for Vendetta’ masks—invoking the 
spirit of insurrection that suffuses James McTeigue’s 2005 film of that name (based on a story by Wachowsky 
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7in a state that has already begun to fail. Danger remains close when the state of 
emergency is evoked. For when the flesh trembles no one can predict what will come 
next.
The foundational story simultaneously invests political violence with meaning 
while documenting it, serving simultaneously as repertoire and archive, mimesis as 
imitation and mimesis as performance (see Spariosu 985). But in order to perform 
the political event, first light and dark must be torn asunder. And the multitude 
(whether stationed by the stage of political theater or on the brink of action in the 
public square) must behold their heterogeneous power, to appear to themselves in 
the mirror of art, theater, dance, or film, as actors on the stage of politics: destroyers 
and creators, creatures and sovereigns, at once.7 Before art’s shimmering mirror we 
(as cultural spectators and political subjects alike) shudder, and struggle to decide 
whether there is a need to act, and if there is whether we have the resources to 
decide, and act correctly. As if the state of exception were always there, waiting to be 
proclaimed (and seized) as such, to be remembered in the excess of immanence, in 
the overflow of desire, in the political event par excellence, from law in the flesh to 
political theater, the public domain of political action, performatively constituting 
the people’s second (transcendent) body, even now.8
And yet, an ever-protective impulse quickens to drop a veil over such beginnings. 
Form conspires to conserve form. The jurisgenerative gives way to the jurispathic: 
law founds law, and then kills it, to save itself from change (see Cover 98). 
Is that the pact, the great political contract, the secular covenant that Hobbes 
famously held out, as the catastrophic violence of sectarian civil war and plague 
swirled around him? Yield up your wild desire in exchange for survival? Sacrifice 
its unwieldy excess on the altar of secular conservation; seek hope in stasis? In 
Hobbes’ archetypal early modern Liberal blueprint for secular investiture, by 
stark contrast to the Elizabethan drama of Hamlet, we witness the state’s sanitized, 
siblings).
7 As in the epilogue from Shakespeare’s The Tempest, spoken to the audience by Prospero, as he passes on 
to them (the sovereign people?) his spell-(un)binding powers, asking that they, by their own breath and 
hands, re-enact the play’s restoration of legitimate sovereign authority in the spirit of compassion, mercy, and 
love—as if to say, it is the people’s task now to perform their acclamation of, and take direct responsibility for, 
legitimacy’s narrative:
But release me from my bands
With the help of your good hands:
Gentle breath of yours my sails
Must fill, or else my project fails,
Which was to please. Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,
And my ending is despair,
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults
Mercy itself and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardon’d be,
Let your indulgence set me free.
8 See Lupton 2005, 96 (‘The decision of the judge refers the order of law back to the founding trauma of 
creation ex nihilo’).
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8‘rational’ beginning, and glimpse how the seeds of its terrifying end may have been 
sown. For in the Hobbesian fantasy of origin, composed in the spirit of geometry 
and the instrumental triumph of rational calculation, Liberal theory’s foundational 
text colludes with a reckoning to come: the price to be paid for violating the reality 
principle of desire, for promulgating a positivist (and nominalist) shift from excess 
vitality in the event of jurisgenesis to mortification of the flesh behind the mask of 
rational necessity. 
Where now are the remains of the King’s transcendent body, its modern trace 
beyond noble dust, in the political excess of popular sovereignty, that transcendent 
investment we carry on our backs if not under our skin?
The flesh waits to convulse again, to rise up from under the deadening load of 
formal validity without significance, beyond bare Hobbesian law, beyond the naked 
power to enforce commands (Hobbes 985, 88). Of course, masking the vitality and 
dangerous volatility of the flesh behind the undoubtedly more palatable appearance 
of cool rational calculation has its merit, along with its distinctive logic. 
It was a timely strategy, and a compelling logic: holding out, between the forces 
of Reformation and Counter-Reformation, an as yet unsullied third way, a ‘neutral’ 
science that might rise above the internecine civil warfare sparked by irreconcilable 
religious passion. But Hobbes’ rhetorical gambit, successful as it was, is a Faustian 
bargain. Its sleight of hand suppression of desire spawned a ghost that haunts the 
legal machinery that it helped to build, a ghost that just as surely haunts the founding 
texts of liberal theory itself.
The great Liberal cleanup operation9 begins here, with the neutral logic of 
clear and distinct ideas, objective calculation, and rational necessity. Perhaps that 
is why Hobbes the rhetorician, the brilliant stylist, obscures his rhetoric, hiding it 
in an anti-rhetorical animus that masked the foundational irrationality of pain and 
desire, violence and love, in the utterly dispassionate rhetoric of geometry. With but 
a handful of natural laws, the human drive to survive chief among them, Hobbes 
invokes with cool precision the logic of rational choice. Never mind the rhetorical 
power operating behind the scenes, the anti-rhetorical rhetoric that generates 
the style of geometric reason in the first place: in Hobbes, the force of rhetorical 
seduction lay hidden behind the mask of geometric formality.
The hidden seduction of rhetorical enchantment is desire’s agent. It is a restless 
spirit,0 a symptom of dis-ease that is bound to return, to have its tale told anew, 
perhaps in order to have its claim set right. 
Kant and Rawls were no more able to bury that restless spirit than was H.L.A. 
9 I am indebted to Mark Antaki of McGill Law School for pressing this idea upon me in the course of 
discussions at the ‘Law in the Flesh’ roundtable on April 2, 204 (sponsored by McGill University’s Institute 
for the Public Life of Arts and Ideas).
0 A ‘ghost’ in Hobbes’ own terms: 
And for the matter, or substance of the Invisible Agents, so fancyed […] call them Ghosts; as the Latines 
called them Imagines, and Umbrae; and thought them Spirits, that is, thin aereall bodies; and those Invisible 
Agents, which they feared, to bee like them; save that they appear, and vanish when they please. (Hobbes 
985, 70-.)
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9Hart, who sought to hide it in his descriptive sociology of positive law’s ‘minimum 
conditions of natural law’. Hart, too, wanted to naturalize the prescriptive demands 
of valid (positive) law (see Hart 96), to neutralize the frightening mess of desire 
that inheres in the original scene of politics. If only we could forget such wild times, 
when ‘wild minds’ host wild meanings (Hamlet V.ii.77-79). If only we could hide 
the danger of desire’s excess, perhaps behind a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’, so that 
natural necessity, or the cooler logic of disembodied rationality might prevail. But 
calculative reason is not what inspires political subjects to become co-makers of 
political reality at the risk of pain, imprisonment, exile, or perhaps even death, 
whether it is in Tiannemen Square in China, or Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia, or Tahrir 
Square in Egypt, or the Occupy Wall Street protests that began in Zuccotti Park in 
New York and soon spread around the United States and the world. As Emerson 
wrote on the eve of America’s great civil war: 
Ideas make real societies and states. […] It will always be so. Every principle is 
a war-note. Who ever attempts to carry out the rule of right & love & freedom 
must take his life in his hand. (Emerson 200, 726.)
Right, love, freedom: in fidelity to formative ideas such as these even life itself may 
not be too high a price to pay. Believe that, and the political event, in the state of 
exception, is no abstraction. These foundational ideas (and others besides, ugly as 
well as noble) are the vestments of investiture, the expressions of significance that 
invest power with meaning. When they are real enough, when the soma shudders 
and shakes off the living death of bare life, for love of the world (that one commits 
to be in) one realizes: ‘There was never any more inception than there is now’ 
(Whitman 982, 90). ‘Urge and urge and urge, Always the procreant urge of the 
world’ (Ibid.). Vitality, excess desire, law in the flesh—that is what moves political 
subjects to action, to a vital commitment to symbolic forms of expression that 
constitute a living nomos.
In the midst of bare life, urgency is all, even if we can never be sure where it will 
lead: violence, death, freedom, vassalage, love, destitution. From de Sade to Artaud, 
to Von Trier, erotic urgency gambles with death and destruction. History teaches 
that politics is hardly immune to the vicissitudes of desire.
Is there, then, no reliable compass to guide us beyond bare life in the state of 
exception? It is in search of guidance, in response to this vital question, that we turn 
to Joshua Oppenheimer’s extraordinary film, The Act of Killing. In keeping with the 
times we live in, Oppenheimer’s film is an appropriately baroque tale, blending genres 
(is this a documentary? A drama? A tragedy? Farce?) even as it seamlessly blends 
reality and fantasy in its uncanny return to the primal scene of political violence. 
The film’s main protagonist is Anwar Congo, a killer, in Indonesia, who served 
the needs of state terror in his youth, brazenly, cruelly. A self-described gangster, a 
thug, who has modeled his persona on Hollywood killers, dressing like them, raffish, 
 See also Leiter 2007. I take issue with Leiter’s ‘naturalization’ of jurisprudence in Sherwin 20, 22-49.
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a lady’s man, who learned from the silver screen the art of killing with a strand of 
wire, openly praising the efficiency of strangulation, how it avoids the stench and 
mess of victims’ blood, although of that, too, he has learned much, while performing 
the state’s bidding.
The massacres in Indonesia began in 965, and continued on through the next 
year. Over a million people were killed. No one knows the exact number. It was 
said the Communists had masterminded a coup d’état that allegedly began when a 
group of military officers belonging to the elite guards of President Sukarno killed 
six important generals. To repel the threat, or so he claimed, Major General Suharto, 
commander of the army’s elite Strategic Forces, launched a counter-attack. The 
mutineers in the army were crushed, and the army-controlled media immediately 
began a campaign against the Communists, asserting that they were behind the 
attempted coup. Members of the Communist Party and alleged collaborators (which 
meant anyone who opposed Suharto’s rise to power) were swept away in a torrent 
of violence, targeted for execution. The Indonesian army could not perform all that 
killing alone, and so Suharto, who was now calling the shots in Indonesia, recruited 
a civilian force, made up of killers like Anwar Congo, who was one of its leaders in 
the heyday of the massacres.
It remains unclear whether the Communist threat was real or a pretext used by 
Suharto to stage his own coup d’etat to overthrow his predecessor, President Sukarno. 
In any event, Suharto’s Indonesian ‘New Order’, aided by its military and civilian-
manned machinery of terror and death, not only triumphed over its foes, but also 
managed to remain in power for 2 years, from 966 to 998. 
The official state story of political origin, the foundational narrative of Suharto’s 
sovereign rule, was repeatedly rehearsed in an official propaganda film, which the 
public, from young to old, was compelled to watch on television and in movie theaters 
around the country throughout Suharto’s rule, thus enacting what one might describe 
as a coerced ritual of simulated investiture. ‘Simulated’ because coercion compels 
only the formal gestures of normative investment, not the authentic acceptance that 
comes of freely committed belief. 
The images that Indonesians were compelled to watch during the Suharto 
regime were meant to foment terror, in the face of a grotesquely violent enemy (the 
‘Communists’) and a perhaps even more terrifying state apparatus of organized 
violence. Civilian killers like Anwar Congo were depicted as national heroes. Indeed, 
more than four decades after having played his part in Suharto’s victory, we see now 
(in Oppenheimer’s film) Congo still being celebrated by Indonesian officials. We 
also see an organized civilian militia of fascist thugs parading before an adoring 
(or are they simply a terrified?) public. Oppenheimer captures some of the current 
civilian leaders nonchalantly reminiscing about ‘the good old days’ of 965, when 
rape routinely accompanied the killing.
We also see in Oppenheimer’s film common thugs as they make their rounds 
in the marketplace, crudely shaking down (mostly Chinese) merchants for payoffs. 
Violence and terror have become routine. One elected official openly recounts 
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the names and business ventures of politicians in high places who are on the take: 
corruption, bribery, and graft are rampant. The ethos of political decadence is so 
normal that one political wannabe, whom we see buffoonishly campaigning among 
voters who openly besiege him for larger payoffs in exchange for their vote, describes 
his chief political idea as coercing money from merchants by threatening them with 
zoning violations. 
It is against this backdrop of pervasive corruption and terror that Oppenheimer’s 
film unfolds. Its premise may be easily stated, though what ensues is anything 
but simple. What would happen, the filmmaker posits, if he gave one of the most 
fearsome gangsters from the time of the massacres the technical means to make a 
film, to tell his story, any way he wants, about what it was like back then, and how it 
feels now, to have participated in the massive killing spree that launched Indonesia’s 
‘New Order’? 
The Act of Killing is the product of that invitation (though we do not know 
the full extent of Oppenheimer’s edits and staging decisions versus those of his 
alternate, killer-director Anwar Congo). The images on the screen are simultaneously 
fascinating, frightening, bizarrely humorous, canny (reflecting Congo’s grasp of film 
aesthetics), bewilderingly surreal, self-lacerating, and almost unbearably poignant.
In the course of the film Congo oscillates between the swaggering bravado 
of his youth and (real or perhaps feigned) physical and emotional suffering as the 
magnitude of his sins begins to dawn upon him. We learn that Congo’s past acts 
haunt him. He cannot sleep, and when he does nightmares descend upon him—
like the recurrent dream in which he sees the severed head of a victim, impulsively 
decapitated by Congo with a machete, whose eyes remained open, eyeing its killer 
from the ground where it fell. This image, it seems, is too much even for Congo. He 
returns obsessively to that scene, wondering at one point why he never bothered to 
close those vacantly staring eyes—as if so slight a gesture might have saved Congo 
from the suffering that has plagued him since.
In the film, he attempts a number of gambits to ease the weight of oppressive 
memory. They span the gamut from ludicrous to horrific. At one point, for example, 
Congo stages a bizarre fantasy of redemption—complete with beautiful dancing 
girls set against the backdrop of a majestic waterfall, in which one of his victims 
respectfully places an ostentatious medal around Congo’s neck as he thanks Congo 
for bringing him to heaven. But for the greater part of the film Congo’s fantasies take 
a much darker turn, depicting re-enactments of gruesome acts of torture and killing 
featuring Congo as the victim. Congo stages his own violent interrogation and death 
by strangulation. We also see him buried in the dirt, being fed (and gagging on) what 
is supposed to be his own raw liver, presumably ripped from his body, while in yet 
another scene we see him lying on the ground beside his own decapitated head.
It does not take much in the way of psychoanalytic speculation to discern here 
the return of the repressed, as if these role reversals might somehow purge from 
Congo’s tortured mind the pain of such recurrent traumatic memories, to drain 
away the haunting violence that roils within him, or at least to find some semblance 
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of significance, to assign these recollections a name so that their meaning might be 
palpably grasped once and for all, perhaps as the first necessary step toward their 
purgation. 
But if that is his goal, Congo does not visibly succeed. He remains not purged 
but in purgatory, on the bare threshold of insight,2 driven by forces he can neither 
name nor understand. How else could he roust from bed his two young grandchildren 
to watch some of the preliminary images that Oppenheimer has provided, 
gruesome images of grandpa, hands tied behind his back, his face bloodied, as he 
is being brutalized by knife-wielding interrogators? Why is Congo smiling, with his 
grandchildren on his knees, coddling them in his arms so close, as he says, ‘See? 
Look at grandpa, how he’s being tortured by that fat guy […]’. What does he expect 
from these innocent children who seem so dear to him, that they might watch and 
understand his confession to them? That these young innocents (perhaps they alone, 
since they alone might embody the last remains of Congo’s capacity for love) are still 
invested with the curative power, love’s privilege, to forgive their grandpa for the evil 
he has committed? Though surely they are hardly old enough to comprehend much 
less forgive what they see on the screen before them. Such is Congo’s confused and 
destitute state.
Amidst the fantasies, the mystifications, and gross self-deceptions, however, 
images of a reckoning of sorts also emerge. As in the film’s final scene in which a 
physically frail, white-haired Congo returns to the rooftop where so many of his 
victims were tortured and killed. It is nighttime, and Congo paces the roof top in 
silence, pausing to gag, again and again, his body repeatedly wracked by dry heaves, 
from deep within. Heaving, as if to purge himself of an unnamed suffering, Congo 
only underscores his emptiness, for nothing comes of the act. He is already empty. 
Repulsed, the viewer might well think, yes, this is bare life. The purgatory in which 
Congo dwells cannot be dispelled. He remains in exile, a liminal creature in the grip 
of ghosts from his past, the victims who leave him no rest. Or so we may be led to 
imagine.
To be sure, there is nothing redemptive about this final scene. Justice remains 
far off. The perpetrators of terror are still free and remain unpunished (see Meister 
202). The victors remain in power, and many still enjoy the material rewards 
and even the public adulation (though most likely feigned) of their past deeds as 
gangsters. For his part, Anwar Congo has barely begun to articulate the full extent 
of his crimes, nor do we know if he ever will assume full responsibility, or seek 
forgiveness. No, there is nothing redemptive here, but that is not to say Oppenheimer 
has not achieved something remarkable, something altogether unparalleled in the 
history of cinema, testing its boundaries—the lines between memory and fantasy, 
truth and fiction, politics and spectacle. 
If we acknowledge there is such a thing as the political unconscious, what I 
2 ‘Maybe I sinned, Joshua?’ Congo says at one point to an off-screen Oppenheimer, as if, notwithstanding the 
incredible insouciance of his tone, after having repeatedly replayed his acts of torture and killing, admittedly 
undertaken hundreds of times with innocent victims, any doubt about the matter could remain.
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have been referring to as the primal scene of political violence, or law in the flesh, I 
would say Oppenheimer takes us uncannily close. Under the skin of Anwar Congo 
we glimpse the usually hidden, liminal, even taboo site of origin (and end) for 
sovereign states, which is also to say, the stage upon which law’s beginning and end are 
performed and judged. In the person of Anwar Congo we witness the quintessential 
creature of political terror: at once the maker (as agent of state violence) and the one 
who (as abject subject) is made (by internalizing state violence shorn of meaning). 
Anwar Congo is Hamlet bereft of the cultural and psychological resources needed to 
become anew—to escape the intensity of his paralysis in the face of injustice. Here is 
a living image of law in the flesh suited to a failed political state under neo-baroque 
conditions: mute, heaving, destitute, empty. In short, Congo remains trapped in a 
perpetual state of emergency. No matter how many representational forms or visual 
images may be placed at his disposal the result remains the same. Endgame. Political 
and psychological catastrophe. 
In baroque and neo-baroque states, laws (like all baroque representational forms) 
proliferate, but their formal validity cannot provide the normative significance that 
legitimation requires. The intensity of their endless production (and reproduction) 
may distract us from the emptiness at their core, but this is only a delaying tactic. 
Fleeting intensities may postpone but they cannot avert collapse into mute terror in 
the baroque process of evacuation that Walter Benjamin described as ‘clean[ing] an 
ultimate heaven, [and] enabling it, as a vacuum, one day to destroy the world with 
catastrophic violence’ (Benjamin 998, 66).
‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt 2005, 5). So begins Carl 
Schmitt’s Political Theology. Here is an addendum. Declaring the state of exception 
may pinpoint the source of state power, but its true origin precedes and may yet 
overtake it. The zero time of the political event, the big bang—that incoherent 
convulsion of violence, like the body in pain—is the moment when worlds, and the 
symbolic representations they are made of, may or may not come into being. This is 
when law in the flesh trembles and asserts itself anew.
The body in pain, mutely closed in on itself, struggles to move beyond violence, 
beyond wordless pain, to something formative. Here is the genealogy of law in the 
flesh.  In the moment after the big bang of political violence, longing begins. Longing 
to close the wound of traumatic violence, to overcome the lack of form, the refusal 
to signify.
To have pain is to have certainty, according to Elaine Scarry (Scarry 985, 
). And certainty is most coveted in times of crisis, when belief in symbolic forms 
contracts to the vanishing point. That is when violence, as origin, comes into its own. 
We recognize it (from Hamlet and from Anwar Congo) as the state of emergency 
within.
That violence, that pain, may be ‘appropriated away from the body’, as Scarry 
 It is the same logic of diversion that generates the need for enemies of the state in order to distort, or conceal 
altogether our responsibility for violence by directing responsibility outward through collective fantasies of 
the hated Other (Žižek 995, 529-0).
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puts it (Ibid., ). Its certainty may be invested in a symbolic form. Violence and pain 
bring a feeling of realness to world making, a living vitality, out of the animation of 
the flesh. Law originates with these worlds. Law empowers their creation and seeks 
to guarantee their continuity—to the extent that the fleshly bond of fidelity to law 
persists.
Law quickens in the political unconscious. But longing is anterior to form, 
including forms of law. The expressive forms that longing inspires can never master 
their source. It is that inexpressible excess which we experience as a lack, to which 
we return in the crisis of belief, and the contraction of symbolic forms that such a 
crisis entails, perhaps to form’s political and legal vanishing point.
Anwar Congo’s story is the story of that descent into violence and its aftermath. 
Without love, and its chief agent, which is justice,4 to re-invest desire in the world, 
or in the self for that matter, nothing coheres, nothing flourishes. This is bare life, a 
restless stasis that will not resolve.
The flourishing of the Liberal state, and of the psyche that suits it, requires 
love because love is stronger than fear, stronger than death, stronger than the 
Hobbesian state could ever allow. Hobbes cannot go beyond fear, but fear cannot 
build a sustainable future. Love, on the other hand, is beholden to futurity, as it is to 
otherness; fear retracts from both. The legal machinery of Hobbes’ Leviathan, in its 
effort to overcome the fear of death, mortifies the flesh of the law, repressing violence 
and desire behind a veil of rational necessity. That blow against desire paradoxically 
fashions political subjects in the image of the living dead, the image of their fear, as 
creatures who face a perpetual state of emergency under conditions of bare life.5
In confronting violence and terror, love seeks to exorcise the ghost that haunts 
the Hobbesian legal machine, a legal system that is valid but lacks significance. It 
is not enough to bind the body politic by fear. Fear may prompt obedience, even 
acquiescence, but it will never inspire love, or fidelity. Which is why legal validity 
standing alone is bound to decay, to fall back into the nothingness of bare life. That is 
the ‘ontological vulnerability’ (Santner 20, 6) of the Liberal state devoid of flesh.
Terror provokes form and intensity, in excess, to disguise the emptiness at 
its core. This is the tell-tale sign of the baroque (Benjamin 978, 286), including 
contemporary neo-baroque cultural and legal representations (see Sherwin 20). 
Baroque social constructions stake their survival on form-as-distraction, but 
distraction will not hold in times of crisis. Only love willingly binds, only love will 
sacrifice the immediate for the future’s sake.
The political challenge par excellence is to continually seek to renew the binding 
power of foundational narratives. Optimally, at least according to the aspirations of 
4 For a recent exploration of this idea, see Nussbaum 20, 5 (‘[A]ll of the core emotions that sustain a 
decent society have their roots in, or are forms of love….[Love] is what gives respect for humanity its life’.).
5 The image of the living dead speaks to the accuracy of the original Egerton frontispiece from Hobbes’ 
Leviathan (which appeared in the manuscript, but was abandoned in the published version) depicting the 
monstrous Leviathan made up of skulls that ghoulishly peer out from the regal body. (See Goodrich 204, 
9.)
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liberal democratic states, this means using power to check power, for freedom’s sake, 
for the sake of diversity in plurality, and autonomy among equals, so that conditions 
hospitable to love may prevail, conditions that nourish the political subject’s free 
investment in the binding force of law so that fidelity to law, as the promise of justice, 
may persist. This is what it means to cast hope in the form of redemptive justice: love 
as fidelity to a perfectable future. 
Turning away from suffering, pain, and death will avail nothing on the path to 
justice. Fidelity to redemptive possibility requires just the reverse, namely: the will to 
test the vitality of extant foundational narratives against the conditions of their birth 
in order to risk judgment, and the actions that judgment compels.
There is no vision, no future, in jurispathic stasis. In this sense, the Hobbesian 
promise of ‘survival’ posits a false hope. Vitality potentiates hope in the flesh as 
the currency of fidelity and the price of legitimation. The sovereign’s two bodies, 
from Kingship to multitude, capture our oscillation between fear and love, power 
and meaning, jurispathic stasis and jurisgenerative vision, legal validity and the 
promise of redemptive justice. Bare life in the state of exception exposes the original 
condition, in all its violence and danger, from which the political event springs. To 
risk that knowledge, and the responsibility it generates, is to expose fidelity’s true 
worth, and the price that must be paid for it, for ultimately, fidelity to law must be 
staked in blood.
Here the spirit of the law is laid bare along with the process that binds us to it. 
It reflects a people’s collective capacity for transcendence, not to deny violence, but 
to acknowledge and struggle to overcome it (see Girard 987; Santner 2005,02-).
Under baroque and neo-baroque conditions, which coincide with the collapse 
of symbolization, in a time when transcendental references seem all but obsolete, 
reflections upon bare life and states of emergency naturally arise. They are what 
baroque and neo-baroque cultures are all about, symptomatically speaking.
Signification marks, even as it constitutes, our bond to the world. The body 
expressively projects aspects of itself into the world, animating it with meaning. 
But sometimes that capacity fails. We experience that want as longing. The lack in 
the world is the flesh echoing back to us its incapacity to signify. Fidelity to law, 
legitimate authority, depends on regaining the capacity to reinvest this drive (the 
excess immanence of desire) back into the world. This, typically, is what poets are 
for: to make possible by naming (or renaming) that investment or (in politico-
jurisprudential terms) that investiture which gives rise to the nomos we live in.
Being without love is destitution, exile, worldlessness. Anwar Congo takes us 
there. His dry heaves at the end of The Act of Killing personify the effort to evacuate 
world loss. It avails nothing, as we see, since the means of expressive re-cathexis are 
lacking. This inchoate state brings Congo in touch with a tear in the fabric of being, 
a state prior to political and psychic order. To extrapolate from that experience, to 
construe it as a state of bare life writ large, is to ask: Is this the legacy of the founding 
terror that lies at the rotten core of Indonesian sovereignty? A warning for other 
states, other political subjects? An invitation to ponder what would it take for a 
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nation, a sovereign people, to extricate itself from perpetual terror, or the threat of 
its imminence?
Here, then, is the decisive moment, the compass point, just after the big bang 
of convulsive violence when we ask: to what network of meaning will the urge to 
transcend the originary lack attach? What form of meaning (if any) will it animate? 
How will the body in pain signify? Or will it?
There is no meaning, no future, in violence without love. Absent the bonding 
power of love we lack that which binds us to others, to ideas, narratives, and 
institutions, and, above all, to the future.
Here is law in the flesh: seething, trapped within itself, heaving, gripped by the 
pain of a great wound, the wound of unsignifying violence and terror. And here, too, 
is political ontology as symptom formation. Here is the lack, the urgent longing that 
sets the political unconscious in motion. Here we meet the most decisive question, 
the one we do not hear from Carl Schmitt, or from Heidegger for that matter. It is 
the ethical question par excellence: What will law in the flesh make of otherness: the 
otherness of sovereignty, the otherness of law, the otherness of the subject?
When power is homologous to the subject’s will, it is perceived as efficacious. 
When power confronts heterogeneous subjects as an Other, it is perceived as the great 
master. Friend or enemy? So we ask: what is Otherness to power within sovereignty 
(in the language of power’s exchange) and what is Otherness without (the subject’s 
power that is either served or thwarted)? 
From the King’s two bodies (from the secular corporeal one, and the one that 
exceeds corporeal immanence, that transcends the material body) to the secular 
modern emergence of what Santner calls the People’s two bodies, sovereignty bears 
the phantasmic traces of its origin: the lack, the originary trauma of violence, and 
the ensuing drive to heal the wound of finite being.  
And so we ask, what are our cultural resources today for expressive significance, 
for investiture, for fidelity to law? For example, do Americans still hear its national 
vitality resound, say, in Walt Whitman’s songs celebrating the ideal of popular 
sovereignty, in fraternal love for the democratic multitude? Songs like Starting from 
Paumnok, in which Whitman (982, 79) writes:
And I will make the poems of my body and of mortality,
For I think I shall then supply myself with the poems of my soul and of 
immortality,
I will make a song for these States that no one State may 
Under any circumstances be subject to another State…
I will sing the song of companionship,
I will show what alone must finally compact these,
I believe these are to found their own ideal of manly love…
I will write the evangel-poem of comrades and of love…
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Here is Eros springing forth, even from the political unconscious, seeking attachment 
in the multitude.
Of course Eros need not express itself as love. It doesn’t do so in the pornographic 
imagination of de Sade, for example, or more recently in Lars Von Trier’s film work, 
such as his recent Nymphomania (Parts I & II). There the conflation of flesh and 
animal life culminates in undifferentiated materiality. This is Deleuzian immanence 
and the baroque logic of sensation as pantheistic animality, Eros as the longing to 
shatter the bond of form that constrains it. As in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, when 
we witness the longing to dissolve, like the spirit, Ariel, into the air or, more to our 
purpose, like the witch Sycorax dissolving back into the earth, for that is the secret 
wish of the pornographic imagination. 
This is Deleuze’s great desire, to give up our creaturely nature by dissolving 
it into the pulse of the universe (Santner 20, 6). Here is Eros mutating into 
Thanatos.
From the imagination comes the power to make images, to project the workings 
of the mind outward in a physical, active form, to actualize ideas, to conceive 
actions, to construct a world, a nomos, to which we are bonded. We encounter this 
in the Elizabethan staging of power and sovereignty, against the backdrop of violent 
usurpation, in baroque masques that perform the will of the King, mirroring his 
mind. As Stephen Orgel puts it: ‘Imagination here is real power: to rule, to control 
and order the world, to subdue other men’ (Orgel 975, 47). 
Power to order the world—but on what basis, and to what end? Is it the 
absolutizing force of fear, as in Hobbes’ Leviathan? The sado-masochistic imagination 
of terror, as in the obscene violence (see Oppenheimer and Uwemedimo 202) of 
Suharto’s and Anwar Congo’s Indonesia? Or is it the spirit of popular sovereignty, as 
in Whitman’s Eros of companionship and the heterogeneous yet equal freedom of 
the multitude?
What Oppenheimer has left us with is a genealogy of the political unconscious. 
Reliving Anwar Congo’s fantasies and terrors, identifying with the heaving body in 
pain, we revert to the state of exception. Here is the perennial origin point for all 
political creation: law in the flesh, when one regime comes to an end, and another 
one rises. This is the time when the flesh of the law, in its uncanny excess, is poised 
to project its vitality into some symbolic representation. This is the time of world 
making, or not, if like Daniel Paul Schreber or Anwar Congo, love is withdrawn 
from the world. 
If there is to be a world, there must be a symbolic form to constitute and 
contain it. A political narrative must follow forth, but a narrative that will always 
bear the mark of its traumatic birth, the unutterable lack that drives and animates it. 
As Martha Nussbaum suggests, the emotions that shape and inform that narrative 
will also constitute its nature.6
6 See Nussbaum 20 (though, in the end, her modernist, neo-Kantian mindset, in alliance with abstract 
Rawlsian principles, may outstrip her grasp of law in the flesh, with its unpredictable danger, manifest in the 
excess desire of bare life in the state of exception).
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Will it be the Hobbesian fear of death? The gangster’s disgust for the Other? 
Whitman’s fraternal love for the multitude? Nussbaum’s aspiration to justice as 
love’s agent? We do not know. But regardless of the social and political meaning 
it contains, there is one bond, the strongest of all social and political forces upon 
which meaning can rely, and that is the bond of love. As Giambattista Vico wrote: 
‘The soul of man must be enticed by corporeal images and impelled to love, for once 
it loves it is easily taught to believe. Once it believes and loves, the fire of passion 
must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to will’ (Vico 990, 8). 
To will that the conditions of civility be preserved, not just peace, but the capacity to 
flourish, which is to say, to will the conditions necessary for meaningful freedom we 
willingly submit to the bondage of love, the love that binds us to what is other (while 
preserving it), an act that in thus limiting our power constitutes a world, a multitude, 
and a future.
Eros is the name we give to the creative force out of which political worlds 
are made, from bare life, out of the political unconscious known as the flesh of the 
law. Political states begin in an excess of desire, an explosion of violence and death. 
For what is desire if not the unthinking impulse to fill the non-signifying void of 
mortality? 
Is it our denial of that stark reality that causes ‘a sacred veil’ to be drawn over 
the beginnings of all governments (Strauss 965, 0), from Rawls’s veil of ignorance, 
with which he seeks to neutralize (or perhaps ‘neuter’) liberal theory, to the anti-
rhetorical veil of ‘rational choice’ with which Hobbes seeks to hide the binding force 
of desire? No matter. Law in the flesh will tear away that veil when the tension of 
restless desire reaches its limit. 
Then the play becomes the thing, compelling judgment and action, forcing the 
ultimate political question: what counter-factual reality must we animate now to
dispel restless stasis and realize the future we desire? Thus does the prospect 
of redemptive justice, in love’s name, continue to haunt the legal and political
imagination.
Epilogue: but will love triumph over catastrophe?
Terror has no future, only perhaps an intensified now. But what constitutes that 
‘now’? The right of enjoyment (and what is that if not a milder form of the will to 
power aspiring to the same forever)? The right of orthodoxy (and what is that if not 
the positing of a timeless now that dissolves temporality itself in the form of some 
supreme metaphysical principle)? Or might it be understood in terms of love, as an 
aspirational ideal, as our commitment to a future on loan from our children (Dupuy 
20, 62)? These possibilities, among others to be sure, constitute what might be 
described as the post-secular condition of contemporary neo-baroque politics and 
law (see Lupton 2000, 2; Santner 2005, ; Sherwin 20).
Global catastrophe, the likes of which we have never known before, manifest in 
the spiraling danger of climate change, may force our hand in this matter (see Latour 
20a; Dupuy 20, 8, 47). Decisions must be made. Do we choose the immediacy 
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of survival now, at all costs, even at the cost of futurity? That is the state of emergency 
in which we live today.
Merleau-Ponty, an early explorer in the realm of the flesh, called flesh an 
element of Being: ‘not matter, not mind, not substance’ but a ‘general manner of 
being’ (Merleau-Ponty 968, 9). He attributed to the flesh that which ‘makes the 
facts have meaning’ (Ibid., 40). In the flesh we are ‘caught up’ with other beings, in 
an experience of ‘co-radiance’, the visible relating to itself (‘animating other bodies as 
well as my own’).
This kind of experiential approach, so brilliantly practiced by the great 
pragmatist William James, is far from exhausted. To the contrary, it is precisely what 
is needed to animate and ground anew the different ontologies that may be linked to 
disparate political and jurisprudential values (see Latour 20b). Likewise, exploring 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘cohesion without concept’ may prove to be of particular 
worth in addressing the challenge of law’s binding power as it emerges from the state 
of exception. Standing alone, disembodied conceptual ideals, descriptive categories 
and typologies, and the cramped behavioral models used to configure rational choice, 
cannot adequately capture the way political beliefs are formed and sustained (or fail) 
in practice. In this respect, experience, desire and affect have yet to be adequately 
tapped as resources for understanding fidelity to law in the legitimation process. It is 
here that we encounter the original ground of wild meaning—the conditions under 
which political meaning is born anew (as ‘an expression of experience by experience’ 
(Ibid., 55)). 
The pulse of the flesh may be taken in the emanations of political and legal 
perturbation—protests, occupations, signs in popular culture of shared anxiety or 
shame or anger. These signs point to something deeper, something that the state of 
emergency exposes: bare life. Here we glimpse the conditions that constitute sovereign 
power, and the significance we assign to it. Agamben refers to our affirmation of that 
significance as ‘acclamation’, though he acknowledges the extent to which public acts 
of assent (in apparent fidelity to law) may be subject to manipulation, particularly in 
the hands of those who control the operation of mass media,7 or outright coercion, 
as occurred under Suharto in Indonesia (and continues to occur in authoritarian 
states around the world).
Yet, if Merleau-Ponty’s insight into the nature of flesh as a manner of being 
in the world is right, its authentic co-radiance with other beings will signify actual 
states of affairs, prompting some to utter (as the ghost of Hamlet’s father prompted 
Hamlet to say): ‘This bodes some strange eruption to our state’ (I.i.69). Or as Otto 
Gierke expressed it: ‘The undying spirit of [Natural] Law can never be extinguished. 
If it is denied entry into the body of positive law, it flutters about the room like a 
ghost’ (Gierke 957, 226).
If contemporary neo-baroque cultural conditions implicate post-secular 
possibilities, we will need new interpretive and critical methods and new 
7 In 940, the German Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, stated: ‘We must give film a task and a 
mission in order that we may use it to conquer the world’ (Rentschler 996, 25).
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interdisciplinary alliances to explore their meaning and their scope in regard to 
contemporary politics and law. Phenomenology, psycho-theology, political theology, 
visual jurisprudence—these are just some of the emerging categories (or perhaps re-
emergent fields) that present themselves to us for further consideration.
The founding moment of political and legal investiture haunts the baroque 
and neo-baroque mind, from Hamlet to The Act of Killing. In the former, Prince 
Hamlet finds the resources to decide, and to act, in the face of injustice; in so doing 
he precipitates a transformative political event that renews the rightful basis for state 
legitimacy. In The Act of Killing, by contrast, restless stasis remains unaltered from 
beginning to end. It is a state of affairs well suited to neo-baroque conditions—a time of 
distracted paralysis, when the availability of the cultural and psychological resources 
needed to go beyond terror and its purgatorial aftermath remains uncertain.
The massive cleanup operation of liberal theory will continue to falter, and 
will ultimately collapse under the weight of law in the flesh in the state of exception, 
unless it is shored up with new methods of assessment along with new sources of 
experience. What is rotten in the heart of the state will not go away. It is invulnerable to 
the sword (Hamlet I.i.44-46). But it may yield its secrets to a braver mindfulness. 
Absent such a re-invigorated interpretive approach, informed by the 
epistemology of flesh and the ontology of collective political life, the reflective 
practice of assessment and prescription cannot productively proceed. It is difficult 
to say how we will fare under current neo- (or digital) baroque conditions. But what 
remains certain is that political and legal perturbations will continue; the flesh will 
tremble anew. Wild meanings will shake the status quo: more signs of the ghost in 
law’s machine.
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